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Abstract
This paper analyzes a spatial model of political competition between two policy-
motivated parties in hard times of crisis. Hard times are modeled in terms of policy-
making costs carried by a newly elected party. The results predict policy divergence in
equilibrium. If the ideological preferences of parties are quite diverse and extreme, there
is a unique equilibrium in which the parties announce symmetric platforms and each party
wins with probability one half. If one party is extreme while the other is more moderate,
there is a unique equilibrium in which the parties announce asymmetric platforms. If
the preferred policies of the parties are not very distinct, there are two equilibria with
asymmetric platforms. An important property of equilibrium with asymmetric platforms
is that a winning party necessarily announces its most preferred policy as a platform.
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A pre-election interview of Artur Mas, the Catalonian regional president:1
Do you agree that in these hard times, very hard times that the world faces now, it is
even more di¢ cult to govern?
Yes, denitely. It is more di¢ cult to govern because the circumstances, all of them, are
more complicated.
1. Introduction
Is political competition a¤ected by an economic, political or nancial crisis? Do political
parties adjust their platforms in hard times? Do they tend to announce more extreme or
more moderate platforms? To answer these questions, I develop a one-period spatial model
of political competition in hard times in a two-party system. I consider two well-established
policy-motivated parties with opposite policy preferences. The policy preferences of voters are
symmetric around the preferred policy of the median voter. The parties run in an election and
commit to their announced platforms, and the party that wins the majority of votes wins the
election (plurality rule). The novelty of the model is in introducing a hard-times assumption.
There are certain factors that characterize policy-making in hard times of crisis. First, policy-
making becomes more complicated. Indeed, crisis brings unemployment, increasing public
debt, ination, bankruptcies, etc. A winning political party faces a much greater number
of more complicated problems to solve in times of recession than in boom times. Second,
in hard times a governing party is likely to be accused of incompetence. The public tends
to blame policy-makers for economic events beyond their control. In hard times, therefore,
a governing party might su¤er a loss of reputation. I formalize such hard-times conditions
in terms of a xed policy-making cost that a winning party carries once in o¢ ce. In hard
times, parties therefore face a trade-o¤ between ideology and its price, while in good times
the trade-o¤ is between ideology and winning.
I rst show that in hard times there is no equilibrium with policy convergence. The reason
is that no party wants to carry the cost of a policy that can be implemented by another party.
Second, if policy-making is very costly, each party would prefer the rivals policy platform
to its own (very costly) platform and thus would tend to announce a platform that is more
extreme than that of its rival. As a result, the parties announce the most extreme opposite
1This was translated from Spanish by the author. The interview was held on November 12, 2010. The
video is available online at http://www.lasexta.com/sextatv/buenafuente/en_las_relaciones_entre_zapatero
_y_yo_estamos_en_el_frio__frio/183131/191. The original in Spanish:
¿Está de acuerdo que en estos tiempos tan difíciles, muy difíciles mundiales todavía es más difícil gobernar?
Sí, señor, sí. Ahora es más difícil gobernar porque las circunstancias son más complicadas todas ellas.
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policies and each wins with probability one half. For a moderate policy-making cost, there
are either one or two equilibria with policy divergence. If the distance between the most
preferred policies (MPPs) of the parties does not exceed the policy-making cost, there are
two equilibria with asymmetric platforms, whereby the winning party announces its MPP
while the losing party picks any policy from a certain equilibrium interval. Therefore, if the
ideologies of the parties are not very distinct, there is one equilibrium in which the party
with a more moderate preferred policy announces it as a platform and wins the election, and
another equilibrium in which the party with a less moderate preferred policy announces it
as a platform and wins the election. However, if the distance between the MPPs exceeds
the policy-making cost, there is a unique equilibrium. If the MPPs are extreme, this is an
equilibrium with symmetric platforms in which each party wins with probability one half and
the announced platforms are more moderate than the MPPs. If one party is extreme and the
other party is relatively more moderate, this is an equilibrium with asymmetric platforms in
which the more moderate party announces its preferred policy and wins the election, while the
losing party announces any policy from a certain equilibrium interval. Thus, if the ideologies
of the parties are diverse there is no equilibrium with asymmetric platforms in which the
more extreme party announces its preferred policy and wins the election. The intuition is
that if this were the case, the losing party (which has a more moderate preferred policy)
could deviate, announcing its preferred policy and winning the election; since the preferred
policies of the parties are quite diverse, such a deviation would be protable.
My results emphasize an important feature of political competition in hard times of crisis
policy divergence. Indeed, in times of costly policy-making, a policy-motivated party would
bear such a cost only if its gains in terms of policy outcomes are large enough, implying
that its announced policy is quite di¤erent from that of the other party. Another important
characteristic of political competition in hard times in a two-party system is the existence
of equilibria with asymmetric platforms in which a winning party announces its MPP. In-
tuitively, if the winning party announces a platform di¤erent from its MPP then it can
protably deviate to the direction of its preferred policy and still win the election. Thus, in
an equilibrium with asymmetric platforms a winning party necessarily announces its MPP.
The spatial model of political competition adopted here goes back to the seminal work
of Downs (1957), who emphasized policy convergence in a two-party system with o¢ ce-
motivated parties. Palfrey (1984) considered entry by a third vote-maximizing party that
announces its platform after observing the choices of the other two o¢ ce-motivated parties.
The third party loses in equilibrium. Its entry, however, a¤ects the policy platforms an-
nounced by the other two parties, leading to policy divergence. Feddersen et al. (1990)
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further modied a spatial model of political competition allowing o¢ ce-motivated candidates
to make decisions regarding entry, as well as policy platforms, and assuming strategic voting.
They showed that in equilibrium, all entrants adopt the ideal policy of the median voter. A
further step was taken by Wittman (1977, 1983, 1990), Calvert (1985), Alesina (1988) and
Roemer (1994), who considered policy-motivated parties. It has been shown that under full
commitment, two policy-motivated parties announce convergent platforms when the distri-
bution of the voters ideal policies is known, and divergent platforms otherwise (Wittman
1977, Calvert 1985, Roemer 1994). Alesina (1988) argued that if the parties cannot commit
to platforms, then in equilibrium each party carries out its preferred policy. Banks (1990)
developed a two-party model of electoral competition in which implementation of a policy
di¤erent from the announced policy is costly to the winning party; moreover, these costs
increase with the di¤erence between the implemented and announced policies. The model
predicts policy divergence for su¢ ciently high values of these costs. Osborne and Slivinski
(1996) and Besley and Coate (1997) independently developed a citizen-candidate model in
which citizens decide whether or not to run as candidates in an election. Similar to Alesina
(1988), they assumed that candidates cannot commit to platforms, and so announce their
preferred policies in equilibrium. They show that, depending on the parameter values, there
might be equilibria with one, two, three or more candidates running.
This paper complements the aforementioned literature by analyzing political competition
between two policy-motivated parties under assumption of costly policy-making. It is impor-
tant to emphasize that I consider a two-party system in which two well-established parties
denitely run in the election, and so make decisions only regarding policy platforms and not
regarding entry. (Think of the US Democrats and Republicans, for example.) An analysis of
entry decisions by parties is left for future research.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section
3 proceeds with the formal analysis. Finally, Section 4 concludes the paper.
2. Model
Consider a society inhabited by a large number (formally a continuum) of individuals, where
the population mass is normalized to unity. Individuals di¤er in their preferences over a
one-dimensional policy outcome x. The set of feasible policies is taken to be a closed interval
[0; 1]. For simplicity, individualsMPP outcome is assumed to be distributed uniformly on
[0; 1]. The individuals have Euclidean preferences, i.e., their utility function is decreasing in
the Euclidean distance between their MPP and an implemented policy.
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A policy outcome is determined through political competition and, in particular, through
a competitive winner-takes-all election. Suppose that there are two well-established political
parties that are major actors in the political arena and therefore denitely run in the election.
The payo¤ function for party i, denoted by i, i = 1; 2, depends on policy proposals x1 and
x2 announced by the parties before the election, so i : [0; 1]
2 ! R. The function i (x1; x2)
is dened explicitly in Section 2.1.
Denition 1. A political equilibrium is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the game played
by the two parties. In other words, a political equilibrium is a policy pair fx1; x2g such that
1 (x

1; x

2)  1 (x; x2) 8x 2 [0; 1] ;
2 (x

1; x

2)  2 (x1; x) 8x 2 [0; 1] :
I assume not only complete information and zero abstention, but also full commitment
such that a newly elected party will implement a policy it has announced before the election.
Then, facing the two party proposals x1 and x2, individuals cast their votes for the one they
prefer according to their Euclidean preferences. If voters are indi¤erent to the two announced
policies, they vote for each party with equal probability. A party that wins the majority of
votes wins the election. In the case of a tie, each party wins with probability one half. This,
together with the assumption of no abstention, implies that the probability of party 1 winning
the election, denoted by p (x1; x2), is given by:
p (x1; x2) =
8>><>>:
1 if (x1 < x2) \ (x1 + x2 > 1) or (x1 > x2) \ (x1 + x2 < 1) ;
1
2 if x1 = x2 or (x1 6= x2) \ (x1 + x2 = 1) ;
0 if (x1 < x2) \ (x1 + x2 < 1) or (x1 > x2) \ (x1 + x2 > 1) :
(2.1)
The parties are therefore the only strategic players in this framework. Once they announce
policy proposals x1 and x2, the election outcome is decided.
The objective of this paper is to analyze political competition between two policy-motivated
parties in hard times of crisis. I search for political equilibria under the assumption of policy-
motivated parties and hard-times conditions. These assumptions are stated in detail in the
following subsection.
2.1. Party Payo¤ Functions
The parties are policy-motivated in the sense of having preferences over the policy space.
i denotes the MPP of party i, i = 1; 2. The parties have opposite policy preferences. To
formalize this idea, it is assumed that 1 < 12 < 2. Party 1 might then be referred to as a
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left-wing party and party 2 as a right-wing party. The utility of party i is decreasing in the
Euclidean distance between its MPP i and an implemented policy, say x:
  jx  ij :
Suppose that society faces hard times of crisis (e.g., recession). There are certain features
that distinguish policy-making in hard times: rst, policy implementation becomes more
challenging and second, a governing party is likely to su¤er reputation loss and be accused
of incompetence. To formalize such hard-times conditions, I assume that the winning party,
once in o¢ ce, carries a xed policy-making cost C > 0 in terms of utility. This can be
interpreted as a cost for policy implementation or a reputational cost.2
I now specify the party payo¤s, i.e., their expected utilities:
1 (x1; x2) = p (x1; x2) (  jx1   1j   C) + (1  p (x1; x2)) (  jx2   1j) ;
2 (x1; x2) = p (x1; x2) (  jx1   2j) + (1  p (x1; x2)) (  jx2   2j   C) ;
where p (x1; x2) is the probability that party 1 wins the election, dened in (2.1). In the
following section, I search for political equilibria fx1; x2g when the payo¤ functions are as
stated above.
3. Analysis
I start the analysis with the following proposition emphasizing the non-existence of political
equilibrium with policy convergence.
Proposition 1. There is no political equilibrium with policy convergence.
Proof. This proposition is easily proved by contradiction. Suppose that in equilibrium
the parties announce the same policy x 2 (0; 1). Each party wins with probability one half
and obtains a payo¤ of   jx  ij   C2 , i = 1; 2. Each party, however, has an incentive to
deviate in order to lose the election and to obtain a payo¤ of   jx  ij, saving the expected
policy-making cost C2 . Therefore, fx; xg is not a political equilibrium. Suppose further that
in equilibrium the parties announce the same extreme policy 0. The payo¤ of party i in this
case is equal to  i  C2 . Party 2, however, is better o¤ deviating to x2 = 1. This gives party
2 a payo¤ of  12   C2 , which is strictly greater than  2   C2 (since 2 > 12). Thus, f0; 0g
is not a political equilibrium. By analogy, f1; 1g is not a political equilibrium as party 1 is
2When C = 0, the model converges to a standard model of political competition with two policy-motivated
parties as analyzed by Wittman (1990) and Calvert (1985).
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better o¤ deviating to x1 = 0; this yields a payo¤ of  12   C2 , which is strictly greater than
1 1  C2 (since 1 < 12). There is therefore no political equilibrium with policy convergence.
Proposition 1 stresses an important feature of political competition in hard timesa lack of
policy convergence. Indeed, why would two political parties with opposite policy preferences
announce the same platform when policy-making is so costly? It makes no sense to carry the
cost of a policy that can be implemented by the other party.
Proposition 1 therefore implies that in political equilibrium the parties announce divergent
policies. In what follows, to prevent bizarre outcomes (such as announcement of a rightist
platform by a left-wing party or vice versa), I restrict the set of choices available to the parties
in the following way: x1 2

0; 12

, x2 2

1
2 ; 1

. Note, moreover, that for high policy-making
costs, each party prefers a rivals platform to its own very costly platform, and thus has an
incentive to announce the most extreme platform from its set of available policies. It is easy
to show that for C > 1, there is a unique political equilibrium in which the parties announce
extreme symmetric platforms f0; 1g and each wins with probability one half. To make the
problem non-trivial, in what follows I assume that C 2 (0; 1].
The following proposition characterizes a political equilibrium in which the parties an-
nounce symmetric (around 12) platforms and each wins with probability one half. (The proof
of this and other propositions can be found in the Appendix.)
Proposition 2. There is a unique political equilibrium with symmetric platforms

1 C
2 ;
1+C
2
	
when C 2 (0; 1), 1 2

0; 1 C2

, 2 2

1+C
2 ; 1

. There is a unique political equilibrium with
symmetric platforms f0; 1g when C = 1, 1 2

0; 12

, 2 2
 
1
2 ; 1

.
Therefore, in this equilibrium, when C 2 (0; 1) the parties announce more moderate
platforms than their MPPs 1 and 2. The announced platforms are symmetric around
1
2 and at a distance of C from each other. Each party wins with probability one half. The
expected payo¤ for party i is equal to  12   i C2 . No party wants to deviate by announcing
a more moderate platform and winning the election. The reason is that the gains in terms of
implemented policy (which are less than C2 ) do not compensate the losses in terms of policy-
making cost C2 . Neither party gains by announcing a more extreme platform and losing the
election. This is because the gains in terms of policy-making cost C2 are equal to the losses in
terms of implemented policy. When C = 1, the parties announce the most extreme platforms
f0; 1g. In this case, no party wants to deviate by announcing a less extreme platform and
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winning the election, as the losses in terms of policy-making cost C2 =
1
2 would exceed the
policy gains.
I turn now to the characterization of equilibria in which the parties announce asymmet-
ric platforms and one party wins the election with probability one. The following lemma
establishes an important property of political equilibria with asymmetric platforms.
Lemma 1. In an equilibrium with asymmetric platforms, the winning party necessarily an-
nounces its MPP.
Proof. This lemma is easily proved by contradiction. Suppose that there is an equilibrium
in which the winning party, say i, announces a platform xi 6= i. Party i, however, can always
protably deviate to the direction of its ideal policy i by a small positive number " and still
win the election. It follows that in an equilibrium with asymmetric platforms, a winning
party announces its MPP.
An equilibrium fx1; x2g in which the parties announce asymmetric platforms must there-
fore have one of the two following structures:
1. f1; x2g such that x2 > 1  1. Party 1 wins the election, i.e., p (1; x2) = 1.
2. fx1; 2g such that x1 < 1  2. Party 2 wins the election, i.e., p (x1; 2) = 0.
The following proposition characterizes political equilibria with asymmetric platforms.
Proposition 3. There is an equilibrium with asymmetric platforms f1; x2g in which party
1 wins the election for the following values of C, 1, 2 and x2:
C 2 (0; 1) ; 1 2
 
max

0; 1 2C2
	
; 1 C2

; 2 2
 
1
2 ; 1 + C

; x2 2 (1  1; 1] ;
C 2 (0; 1) ; 1 = 1 C2 ; 2 2
 
1
2 ; 1

; x2 2 (1  1; 1] ;
C 2 (0; 1) ; 1 2
 
1 C
2 ;min

1
2 ; 1  C
	
; 2 2
 
1
2 ; 1

; x2 2 [1 + C; 1] ;
C 2 (0; 1) ; 1 2

min

1
2 ; 1  C
	
; 12

; 2 2
 
1
2 ; 1

; x2 = 1;
C = 1; 1 2
 
0; 12

; 2 2
 
1
2 ; 1

; x2 = 1:
There is an equilibrium with asymmetric platforms fx1; 2g in which party 2 wins the
election for the following values of C, 1, 2 and x1:
C 2 (0; 1) ; 2 2
 
1
2 ;max

1
2 ; C
	
; 1 2

0; 12

; x1 = 0;
C 2 (0; 1) ; 2 2
 
max

1
2 ; C
	
; 1+C2

; 1 2

0; 12

; x1 2 [0; 2   C] ;
C 2 (0; 1) ; 2 = 1+C2 ; 1 2

0; 12

; x1 2 [0; 1  2) ;
C 2 (0; 1) ; 2 2
 
1+C
2 ;min

1; 1+2C2
	
; 1 2

2   C; 12

; x1 2 [0; 1  2) ;
C = 1; 2 2
 
1
2 ; 1

; 1 2

0; 12

; x1 = 0:
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It is important to stress here that in some cases there is a continuum of payo¤-equivalent
equilibria with asymmetric platforms in which winning party i announces its MPP i and
obtains a payo¤ of  C, while losing party j announces any policy from an equilibrium
interval and obtains a payo¤ of   jj   ij, i; j = 1; 2, i 6= j. I refer to such a continuum of
payo¤-equivalent equilibria as one equilibrium, specifying that a losing party can choose any
platform from an equilibrium interval.
Note that the party problem is symmetric and therefore equilibria with asymmetric plat-
forms are symmetric around 12 . In other words, if there is an equilibrium in which party 1
wins the election for the pair of MPPs 1 and 2, then there is an equilibrium in which party
2 wins the election for the pair of MPPs 1   2 and 1   1. Consider an equilibrium with
asymmetric platforms in which, say, party 1 wins the election, f1; x2g. (The intuition for an
equilibrium in which party 2 wins the election is analogous.) Party 2s announced platform
is more extreme than party 1s, i.e., x2 > 1 1. Party 1 implements its MPP and therefore
obtains  C. It has no incentive to deviate by announcing a more extreme policy and tying
or losing the election. In this case, the gains in terms of policy-making cost (C2 if tying or C if
losing) do not compensate the losses in terms of implemented policy (x2  12 if tying or x2 1
if losing) for x2 specied in Proposition 3. Party 2 loses the election and obtains a payo¤ of
1   2. It would not deviate by announcing a less extreme policy and tying or winning the
election. Indeed, in this case, party 2 would carry a policy-making cost (C2 if tying or C if
winning) that exceeds the gains in terms of implemented policy (min f2; 1  1g  12 if tying
or 2   1 if winning) for the parameter values specied in Proposition 3.
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 represent political equilibria for C 2  0; 12 and C 2  12 ; 1, respec-
tively. The horizontal axis depicts the MPP of party 1, 1 2

0; 12

, and the vertical axis
depicts the MPP of party 2, 2 2
 
1
2 ; 1

. The dashed lines represent the boundaries of open
sets. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 specify how many and what equilibria there are for each pair of party
MPPs f1; 2g 2

0; 12
 12 ; 1. Note that if the distance between the party MPPs is greater
than the policy-making cost C, i.e., 2 1 > C, or if one of the parties has an extreme MPP,
i.e., 1 = 0 or 2 = 1, then there is just one political equilibrium for C 2 (0; 1). Otherwise,
there are two political equilibria for C 2 (0; 1). The reason is that when 2   1 > C, only
the party with the less extreme MPP wins in an equilibrium with asymmetric platforms. If
the party with the more extreme MPP wins, this cannot be an equilibrium with asymmetric
platforms since the party with the less extreme MPP would like to deviate to win the election.
Indeed, the losses in terms of policy-making cost C if winning are less than the gains in terms
of implemented policy 2   1. However, when 2   1  C, there are two equilibria with
asymmetric platforms, since both the party with the less extreme MPP and the party with
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Figure 3.1: Political equilibria for C 2  0; 12.
the more extreme MPP can win the election. In an equilibrium in which the party with the
more extreme MPP wins, the party with the less extreme MPP does not want to deviate to
win the election as the losses in terms of policy-making cost C if winning exceed the gains in
terms of implemented policy 2 1. Political equilibria for C 2 (0; 1) are formally described
in Table 1 in the Appendix.
Table 2 in the Appendix describes political equilibria for C = 1. When C = 1, there is an
equilibrium with extreme symmetric platforms f0; 1g. Moreover, when C = 1 and the parties
are not extreme, i.e., 1 6= 0 and 2 6= 1, there are two more equilibria with asymmetric
platforms f1; 1g and f0; 2g. If one of the parties is extreme, only one equilibrium with
asymmetric platforms arises for C = 1: f0; 2g when 1 = 0 or f1; 1g when 2 = 1.
It is important to stress here that I consider two well-established parties that would not
exit political competition. The model predictions would change if the parties made decisions
regarding entry. However, I want to concentrate the analysis on a two-party system with
policy-motivated parties that will denitely run for o¢ ce. The following theorem summarizes
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Figure 3.2: Political equilibria for C 2  12 ; 1.
the above results.
Theorem 3.1. i) When the policy-making cost exceeds the length of the set of feasible
policies (C > 1), there is a unique equilibrium in which the parties announce the most
extreme policies f0; 1g and each party wins with probability one half.
ii) When the policy-making cost equals the length of the set of feasible policies (C = 1),
there is an equilibrium with extreme symmetric platforms f0; 1g for any 1 2

0; 12

and
2 2
 
1
2 ; 1

. Moreover, there are two equilibria with asymmetric platforms f1; 1g and
f0; 2g when the party MPPs are not extreme, i.e., when 1 2
 
0; 12

and 2 2
 
1
2 ; 1

.
If party 1 is extreme (1 = 0), there is an equilibrium f0; 2g. If party 2 is extreme
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(2 = 1), there is an equilibrium f1; 1g.
iii) When the policy-making cost is lower than the length of the set of feasible policies
(C < 1), depending on the party MPPs there are either one or two political equilib-
ria. If the distance between the party MPPs does not exceed the policy-making cost
(2 1  C) and the parties are not extreme (1 6= 0 and 2 6= 1), then there are two
equilibria with asymmetric platforms whereby the winning party announces its MPP
and the losing party announces any policy from a certain equilibrium interval. Other-
wise, there is a unique political equilibrium: if 1 2

0; 1 C2

and 2 2

1+C
2 ; 1

this is
an equilibrium with symmetric platforms

1 C
2 ;
1+C
2
	
; otherwise, this is an equilibrium
with asymmetric platforms in which the party with the less extreme MPP announces
its MPP and wins the election and the losing party announces any policy from a certain
equilibrium interval.
A welfare analysis of the problem is of interest. I dene social welfare as the aggregate
welfare of society excluding the party payo¤s.3 Therefore, when the implemented policy is
x, social welfare, denoted by W (), is equal to:
W (x) =
Z 1
0
  jx  yj dy =  1
2
+ x  x2;
which is symmetric around 12 and takes a maximum in
1
2 . It follows then that the closer
the implemented policy is to 12 , the better o¤ is society. Thus, in the cases of two equilibria
with asymmetric platforms f1; x2g and fx1; 2g, they can be ranked according to the social
welfare they generate: W (1) R W (2) if 1 R 1   2. The same predictions are achieved
if the party payo¤s  C and   (2   1) are included in the social welfare function.
4. Conclusion
This paper builds a simple model of political competition in a two-party system under the
assumption of costly policy-making in hard times of crisis. Two policy-motivated parties
simultaneously announce policy platforms under complete information, full commitment and
zero abstention. Hard times are modeled in terms of a xed policy-making cost, which a
winning party carries once in o¢ ce. I characterize political equilibria of the game for dif-
ferent policy-making costs and party MPPs. An important feature of political competition
in hard times is the non-existence of equilibrium with policy convergence. For moderate
3Alternatively, the party payo¤s could be introduced in the social welfare function.
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policy-making costs there are either one or two political equilibria. If the distance between
party MPPs does not exceed the policy-making cost, there are two equilibria with asymmetric
platforms in which the winning party announces its MPP. Otherwise, there is a unique po-
litical equilibrium. When the parties are quite extreme, then an equilibrium with symmetric
platforms occurs in which each party wins with probability one half. If one party is extreme
and the other party is relatively more moderate, this is an equilibrium with asymmetric plat-
forms in which the party with the more moderate MPP announces it as a platform and wins
the election. For high policy-making costs there is a unique equilibrium in which the parties
announce the most extreme policies and each wins with probability one half.
Even though the model is very stylized, it yields a number of empirically testable pre-
dictions. Policy-making is denitely more costly in hard times than in good times. In fact,
in good times the policy-making cost might be zero or negative, reecting the ego rents of
the parties from policy-making. A standard model of political competition with two policy-
motivated parties and ego rents predicts policy convergence to the preferred policy of the
median voter (Wittman 1990, Calvert 1985). My model of political competition under costly
policy-making emphasizes the non-existence of political equilibrium with policy convergence.
It predicts not only policy divergence, but also equilibria in which the parties announce
asymmetric platforms. Therefore, simple testable hypotheses might be as follows. First, in
a two-party system, the parties announce more convergent platforms in boom times and less
convergent platforms in recession times. Second, the winning margin is expected to be greater
during a recession than during a boom.
Note that I have focused on political competition with an exogenous policy-making cost.
It would be of interest to consider a setting in which such a cost arises endogenously. The
model can also be generalized by considering a non-symmetric distribution of voter MPPs.
These tasks are left for future research.
Appendix
A. Proof of Proposition 2
Consider a pair of policy proposals fx1; x2g such that x1 = 1   x2, x1 2
 
0; 12

, x2 2
 
1
2 ; 1

.
Given these x1 and x2, each party wins with probability one-half. Party 1s payo¤ is equal to
1 (x1; x2) =
1
2 (  jx1   1j   C) + 12 (  jx2   1j). Party 2s payo¤ is equal to 2 (x1; x2) =
1
2 (  jx1   2j) + 12 (  jx2   2j   C).
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1. If party 1 deviates and announces a platform x01 2 [0; x1), then it loses the election
and gets the payo¤ 1 (x01; x2) =   jx2   1j. Such a deviation is not protable only if
1 (x1; x2)  1 (x01; x2), which yields   jx1   1j C    (1  x1   1). If party 1 de-
viates and announces a platform x001 2
 
x1;
1
2

, then it wins the election and gets the pay-
o¤1 (x001; x2) =   jx001   1j C. Such a deviation is not protable only if 1 (x1; x2) 
1 (x
00
1; x2), which implies
1
2 (  jx1   1j   C) + 12 ( 1 + x1 + 1)    jx001   1j   C.
a) Consider the case where x1 < 1. The conditions 1 (x1; x2)  1 (x01; x2) and
1 (x1; x2)  1 (x001; x2) become 1  1 C2 and x1  1 C2  jx001   1j, respectively.
To guarantee that the latter inequality holds for each x001 2
 
x1;
1
2

, it is required
that x1  1 C2 . It follows then that 1  1 C2  x1, which does not hold for
x1 < 1. Therefore, when x1 < 1, party 1 can deviate protably.
b) Consider the case where x1  1. The conditions 1 (x1; x2)  1 (x01; x2) and
1 (x1; x2)  1 (x001; x2) become x1  1 C2 and x001  1 C2 , respectively. The latter
inequality holds for each x001 2
 
x1;
1
2

only if x1 = 1 C2 (where C < 1). Indeed, if
x1 <
1 C
2 then there is x
00
1 2
 
x1;
1 C
2

that implies that party 1 has a protable
deviation. Therefore, party 1 will not deviate only if 1  1 C2 and x1 = 1 C2 ,
where C < 1.
2. If party 2 deviates and announces a platform x02 2 (x2; 1], then it loses the election
and gets the payo¤ 2 (x1; x02) =   jx1   2j. Such a deviation is not protable only if
2 (x1; x2)  2 (x1; x02), which implies   jx2   2j C  1 x2 2. If party 2 deviates
and announces a platform x002 2

1
2 ; x2

, then it wins the election and its payo¤ becomes
2 (x1; x
00
2) =   jx002   2j   C. This deviation is not protable only if 2 (x1; x2) 
2 (x1; x
00
2), which yields
1
2 (1  x2   2) + 12 (  jx2   2j   C)    jx002   2j   C.
a) Consider the case where x2 > 2. The conditions 2 (x1; x2)  2 (x1; x02) and
2 (x1; x2)  2 (x1; x002) become 2  1+C2 and x2  1+C2 + jx002   2j, respectively.
To guarantee that the latter inequality holds for each x002 2

1
2 ; x2

, it is necessary
that x2  1+C2 . Therefore, x2  1+C2  2, which is not possible for x2 > 2.
Therefore, party 2 has protable deviations when x2 > 2.
b) Consider the case where x2  2. The conditions 2 (x1; x2)  2 (x1; x02) and
2 (x1; x2)  2 (x1; x002) become x2  1+C2 and x002  1+C2 , respectively. The latter
inequality holds for each x002 2

1
2 ; x2

only if x2 = 1+C2 (where C < 1). Indeed, if
x2 >
1+C
2 then there is x
00
2 2
 
1+C
2 ; x2

that means that party 2 has a protable
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deviation. Thus, party 2 will not deviate only if 2  1+C2 and x2 = 1+C2 , where
C < 1.
Therefore, both parties do not deviate from fx1; x2g such that x1 = 1   x2, x1 2
 
0; 12

,
x2 2
 
1
2 ; 1

only if 1  1 C2 , 2  1+C2 , and x1 = 1 C2 , x2 = 1+C2 , where C < 1. In other
words, there is a unique political equilibrium with symmetric platforms

1 C
2 ;
1+C
2
	
when
1  1 C2 , 2  1+C2 , C < 1.
Consider now a pair of policy proposals f0; 1g. Each party wins with probability one-half.
The partiespayo¤s are equal to i (0; 1) =  12 C2 , i = 1; 2. If party i deviates and announces
a less extreme policy x0i, it wins the election and gets the payo¤ i (x
0
i; ) =   jx0i   ij   C.
Note that i (x0i; ) takes its maximum value  C when x0i = i. To guarantee that party i
has no protable deviations it is required i (0; 1)  maxi (x0i; ), which amounts to C  1.
Therefore, f0; 1g is a political equilibrium for C  1.
B. Proof of Proposition 3
Characterization of an equilibrium in which the parties announce asymmetric
platforms and party 1 wins the election.
Consider a pair of policy proposals f1; x2g such that 1 2
 
0; 12

and x2 2 (1  1; 1].
Given these proposals, party 1 wins the election and gets the payo¤ 1 (1; x2) =  C. The
payo¤ of party 2 is equal to 2 (1; x2) =   j1   2j.
1. If party 1 deviates and announces a platform x01 2
 
1  x2; 12

, then it still wins the
election and its payo¤ becomes 1 (x01; x2) =   jx01   1j   C. However, 1 (x01; x2) <
1 (1; x

2) and so such a deviation is not protable. If party 1 deviates and announces a
platform 1 x2, then there is a tie and each party wins with probability one-half. Party
1s payo¤ becomes 1 (1  x2; x2) = 12 (  j1  x2   1j   C) + 12 (  jx2   1j). Such a
deviation is not protable only if 1 (1; x2)  1 (1  x2; x2), which implies x2  1+C2 ,
where C  1. Consider the case where x2 6= 1. If party 1 deviates and announces
x001 2 [0; 1  x2), then it loses the election and gets the payo¤1 (x001; x2) =   jx2   1j.
Such a deviation is not protable only if 1 (1; x2)  1 (x001; x2), which yields x2 
1 + C. Therefore, when the parties announce f1; x2g such that 1 2
 
0; 12

and
x2 2 (1  1; 1), party 1 has no protable deviations only if x2  max

1+C
2 ; 1 + C
	
,
where C < 1. When the parties announce f1; 1g such that 1 2
 
0; 12

, party 1 has no
protable deviations only if C  1.
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2. If party 2 deviates and announces 1  1, then there is a tie and each party wins with
probability one-half. The payo¤ of party 2 becomes 2 (1; 1  1) = 12 (  j1   2j)+
1
2 (  j1  1   2j   C). Such a deviation is not protable only if2 (1; x2)  2 (1; 1  1),
which amounts to 1 2    j1  1   2j C. If party 2 deviates and announces x02 2
1
2 ; 1  1

, then it wins the election and gets the payo¤2 (1; x02) =   jx02   2j  C.
This deviation is not protable only if 2 (1; x2)  2 (1; x02), which implies 1 2 
  jx02   2j   C.
a) Consider the case where 2 < 1  1. The conditions 2 (1; x2)  2 (1; 1  1)
and 2 (1; x2)  2 (1; x02) become 2  1+C2 and 2  1 + C, respectively.
It implies therefore that in case 2 < 1   1, party 2 will not deviate only if
2  min

1+C
2 ; 1 + C
	
.
b) Consider the case where 2 = 1  1. The conditions 2 (1; x2)  2 (1; 1  1)
and 2 (1; x2)  2 (1; x02) become 2  1 +C and x02  1 +C, respectively.
Once the former inequality holds, the latter inequality will hold too since x02 <
1 1 = 2  1+C. It means that in case 2 = 1 1, party 2 will not deviate
only if 2  1 + C, which amounts to 1  1 C2 .
c) Consider the case where 2 > 1  1. The conditions 2 (1; x2)  2 (1; 1  1)
and 2 (1; x2)  2 (1; x02) become 1  1 C2 and x02  1 + C, respectively.
Once the former inequality holds, the latter inequality will hold too since the
former inequality implies 1   1  1 + C, and therefore x02 < 1   1  1 + C.
It follows then that in case 2 > 1  1, party 2 has no protable deviations only
if 1  1 C2 .
Therefore, when the parties announce f1; x2g such that 1 2
 
0; 12

and x2 2 (1  1; 1],
party 2 has no protable deviations only in the following cases: either 2 < 1 1 and
2  min

1+C
2 ; 1 + C
	
or 2  1  1 and 1  1 C2 .
Combining the conditions that guarantee that neither party has protable deviations
yields the set of the parameters for which there is an equilibrium with asymmetric platforms
f1; x2g with party 1 winning:
C 2 (0; 1) ; 1 2
 
max

0; 1 2C2
	
; 1 C2

; 2 2
 
1
2 ; 1 + C

; x2 2 (1  1; 1] ;
C 2 (0; 1) ; 1 = 1 C2 ; 2 2
 
1
2 ; 1

; x2 2 (1  1; 1] ;
C 2 (0; 1) ; 1 2
 
1 C
2 ;min

1
2 ; 1  C
	
; 2 2
 
1
2 ; 1

; x2 2 [1 + C; 1] ;
C 2 (0; 1) ; 1 2

min

1
2 ; 1  C
	
; 12

; 2 2
 
1
2 ; 1

; x2 = 1;
C = 1; 1 2
 
0; 12

; 2 2
 
1
2 ; 1

; x2 = 1:
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Characterization of an equilibrium in which the parties announce asymmetric
platforms and party 2 wins the election.
Consider a pair of policy proposals fx1; 2g such that 2 2
 
1
2 ; 1

and x1 2 [0; 1  2).
Given these proposals, party 2 wins the election and gets the payo¤ 2 (x1; 2) =  C. The
payo¤ of party 1 is equal to 1 (x1; 2) =   j2   1j.
1. If party 2 deviates and announces a platform x02 2

1
2 ; 1  x1

, then it still wins the
election and its payo¤ becomes 2 (x1; x02) =   jx02   2j   C. However, 2 (x1; x02) <
2 (x

1; 2) and so such a deviation is not protable. If party 2 deviates and announces a
platform 1 x1, then there is a tie and each party wins with probability one-half. Party
2s payo¤ becomes 2 (x1; 1  x1) = 12 (  jx1   2j) + 12 (  j1  x1   2j   C). Such a
deviation is not protable only if 2 (x1; 2)  2 (x1; 1  x1), which implies x1  1 C2 ,
where C  1. Consider the case where x1 6= 0. If party 2 deviates and announces
x002 2 (1  x1; 1], then it loses the election and gets the payo¤2 (x1; x002) =   jx1   2j.
Such a deviation is not protable only if 2 (x1; 2)  2 (x1; x002), which yields x1 
2   C. Therefore, when the parties announce fx1; 2g such that 2 2
 
1
2 ; 1

and
x1 2 (0; 1  2), party 2 has no protable deviations only if x1  min

1 C
2 ; 2   C
	
,
where C < 1. When the parties announce f0; 2g such that 2 2
 
1
2 ; 1

, party 2 has no
protable deviations only if C  1.
2. If party 1 deviates and announces 1  2, then there is a tie and each party wins with
probability one-half. The payo¤of party 1 becomes1 (1  2; 2) = 12 (  j1  2   1j   C)+
1
2 (  j2   1j). Such a deviation is not protable only if 1 (x1; 2)  1 (1  2; 2),
which amounts to 1 2    j1  2   1j C. If party 1 deviates and announces x01 2 
1  2; 12

, then it wins the election and gets the payo¤1 (x01; 2) =   jx01   1j  C.
This deviation is not protable only if 1 (x1; 2)  1 (x01; 2), which implies 1 2 
  jx01   1j   C.
a) Consider the case where 1 > 1  2. The conditions 1 (x1; 2)  1 (1  2; 2)
and 1 (x1; 2)  1 (x01; 2) become 1  1 C2 and 1  2   C, respectively.
It implies therefore that in case 1 > 1   2, party 1 will not deviate only if
1  max

1 C
2 ; 2   C
	
.
b) Consider the case where 1 = 1  2. The conditions 1 (x1; 2)  1 (1  2; 2)
and 1 (x1; 2)  1 (x01; 2) become 1  2  C and x01  2  C, respectively.
Once the former inequality holds, the latter inequality will hold too since x01 >
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1 2 = 1  2 C. It means that in case 1 = 1 2, party 1 will not deviate
only if 1  2   C, which amounts to 2  1+C2 .
c) Consider the case where 1 < 1  2. The conditions 1 (x1; 2)  1 (1  2; 2)
and 1 (x1; 2)  1 (x01; 2) become 2  1+C2 and x01  2   C, respectively.
Once the former inequality holds, the latter inequality will hold too since the
former inequality implies 1   2  2   C, and therefore x01 > 1   2  2   C.
It follows then that in case 1 < 1  2, party 1 has no protable deviations only
if 2  1+C2 .
Therefore, when the parties announce fx1; 2g such that 2 2
 
1
2 ; 1

and x1 2 [0; 1  2),
party 1 has no protable deviations only in the following cases: either 1 > 1 2 and
1  max

1 C
2 ; 2   C
	
or 1  1  2 and 2  1+C2 .
Combining the conditions that guarantee that neither party has protable deviations
yields the set of the parameters for which there is an equilibrium with asymmetric platforms
fx1; 2g with party 2 winning:
C 2 (0; 1) ; 2 2
 
1
2 ;max

1
2 ; C
	
; 1 2

0; 12

; x1 = 0;
C 2 (0; 1) ; 2 2
 
max

1
2 ; C
	
; 1+C2

; 1 2

0; 12

; x1 2 [0; 2   C] ;
C 2 (0; 1) ; 2 = 1+C2 ; 1 2

0; 12

; x1 2 [0; 1  2) ;
C 2 (0; 1) ; 2 2
 
1+C
2 ;min

1; 1+2C2
	
; 1 2

2   C; 12

; x1 2 [0; 1  2) ;
C = 1; 2 2
 
1
2 ; 1

; 1 2

0; 12

; x1 = 0:
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Values of the parameters C, 1 and 2: 1 equilibrium:
C 2 (0; 1) ; 1 2

0; 1 C2

; 2 2
 
1+C
2 ; 1
 
1 C
2 ;
1+C
2
	
;
C 2 (0; 1) ; 2 2
 
max

1
2 ; C
	
; 1+C2

; 1 2 [0; 2   C) fx1; 2g, x1 2 [0; 2   C] ;
C 2 (0; 1) ; 1 2

1 C
2 ;min

1
2 ; 1  C
	
; 2 2 (C + 1; 1] f1; x2g, x2 2 [1 + C; 1] ;
C 2  12 ; 1 ; 1 = 0; 2 2  12 ; C f0; 2g ;
C 2  12 ; 1 ; 2 = 1; 1 2 1  C; 12 f1; 1g ;
2 equilibria:
C 2 (0; 1) ; 2 2
 
max

1
2 ; C
	
; 1+C2

; 1 2

2   C; 1 C2
 f1; x2g, x2 2 (1  1; 1] ;
fx1; 2g, x1 2 [0; 2   C] ;
C 2 (0; 1) ; 1 2
 
1 C
2 ;min

1
2 ; 1  C
	
; 2 2

1+C
2 ; 1 + C
 f1; x2g, x2 2 [1 + C; 1] ;
fx1; 2g, x1 2 [0; 1  2) ;
C 2 (0; 1) ;1 = 1 C2 ; 2 = 1+C2 	[
1 2
 
1 C
2 ;min

1
2 ; 1  C
	
; 2 2
 
max

1
2 ; C
	
; 1+C2
	 f1; x2g, x2 2 [1 + C; 1] ;fx1; 2g, x1 2 [0; 2   C] ;
C 2  12 ; 1 ; 1 2  0; 1 C2  ; 2 2  12 ; C f1; x2g, x2 2 (1  1; 1] ;f0; 2g ;
C 2  12 ; 1 ; 1 2  1 C2 ; 1  C ; 2 2  12 ; C f1; x2g, x2 2 [1 + C; 1] ;f0; 2g ;
C 2  12 ; 1 ; 1 2 1  C; 12 ; 2 2  12 ; C f1; 1g ;f0; 2g ;
C 2  12 ; 1 ; 1 2 1  C; 12 ; 2 2  C; 1+C2  f1; 1g ;fx1; 2g, x1 2 [0; 2   C] ;
C 2  12 ; 1 ; 1 2 1  C; 12 ; 2 2 1+C2 ; 1 f1; 1g ;fx1; 2g, x1 2 [0; 1  2) ;
Table 1. Political equilibria for C 2 (0; 1).
Values of the parameters C, 1 and 2: Political equilibria:
C = 1; 1 = 0; 2 2
 
1
2 ; 1
 f0; 2g, f0; 1g ;
C = 1; 2 = 1; 1 2
 
0; 12
 f1; 1g, f0; 1g ;
C = 1; 1 2
 
0; 12

; 2 2
 
1
2 ; 1
 f1; 1g, f0; 2g, f0; 1g ;
C = 1; 1 = 0; 2 = 1 f0; 1g :
Table 2. Political equilibria for C = 1.
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